I. US-dominated "World Order" with rising new rivalry
Ambitions:
The "Clinton-doctrine" (as expressed in San Francisco speech Feb. 26th, 1999): "It is easy to say we have no interests in who is living in any valley in Bosnia, who owns a bit of skimpy soil in the Horn of Africa or who owns a field at the bank of the River Jordan. But we can not grade our interests by how far away or how small a place is, or whether we can pronounce it. The question we must raise is: what will be the consequences for our security if we let conflicts grow and spread? We cannot, and ought not, do everything nor be everywhere. But where our values and interests are at stake, and where we can do something, we must be ready to act."
Zbigniew Brzezinski (foreign and military adviser from Carter to Clinton, in his book The Grand Chessboard, 1997): "For the US the greatest political price is Eurasia (referring to the Eurasian corridor from Szczecin at the Baltic Sea, through Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltic through the Balkans and Turkey to the Caspian region and the former Central-Asian Soviet republics, all the way to Xinjiang and Tibet) ... The global hegemony of the US depends directly on for how long and how effectively we are able to maintain our superiority on the Eurasian continent". He also proclaimed that there would only be 10-20 years to take control of this "corridor" before "the door is closed". No time to waste!
Conditions:
The US dominant position both in terms of economy, politics and military after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia cancelled the balance of power created by both Yalta and Versailles. Never before in the history of imperialism has such a vast area been laid out for redivision.
Untypical UN-situation 1988 to 1997/98 ending. Similarities with the ending of League of Nations in the 1930s.
Normalising and reunification of Germany changing the internal balance of power in Europe.
Sharpening of economical crisis of imperialism.
II. German regaining power within US-dominated Europe
1. The EU economic project of an internal market is favouring the strongest economic power in Western Europe, Germany, but is also favourable to US firms. (But for the US the euro-project is "double-sided"; weakening the dollar-dominated world system). This project also is sharpening the contradictions between capital and labour.
2. The EU political project is accelerated by the economic project but is creating new internal contradictions between the leading imperialist powers in Europe and between the US and the dominant power of EU, Germany. (Still the unity between the US and Germany is dominant.) In recent decades France has led the opposition to the US-dominance, but they never have been able to make the EU to challenge the US. France will most probably join Britain in trying to counter Germany and even side with the US if there is a rupture between the US and Germany in the future).
3. The EU military project is a part of, and a prolongation of, the political project and is also pushed by the process of economic integration. On the one hand it is also applauded by the US, wanting the Europeans to take greater responsibility for common security tasks in Europe. But in the longer run, the main effect will be the sharpening of the contradictions between the US and the German-led bloc in Europe.
III. The military strategy of the EU
1. The awakening of the slumbering WEU in 1984 marks the start of the EU military project. The restructuring of the WEU coincided with the initiative of the Round Table of European Industrialists and the plans for the Internal Market and the EU.
These initiatives took place before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in a situation in which Western Europe was totally dependent upon the US for its military security. The collapse put a new rivalry on the agenda. But, still eight years after the collapse, the military capacity of a joint WEU-military force is "nothing" compared to the US-led NATO. Even the individual armies of Germany, France and Britain are more capable of conducting warfare. But, nevertheless, the restructuring process of the WEU plays an important role in the militarising of Europe and the emerging of contradictions between the US and the German-led bloc in Europe.
2. By now the military structure of WEU have following elements:
A command centre with a staff of 30-40 situated in Brussels.
A satellite-centre is being developed in Madrid (but still dependent upon US satellite observations).
The Euro-corps consisting of 50,000 soldiers from France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg and now also the Netherlands. Even Hungary and Slovenia, non-EU-states, are offering some troops for the WEU.
The Euromarfor - with ships from Portugal, Spain, France and Italy.
Other forces being prepared for WEU-missions.
WEU operation in the field first took place in 1987 in the Persian Gulf, with a ship during the Iranian-Iraqi-war. Expanding in the Gulf-war in 1991 and in partaking in operations in Africa and now in the Balkans, but still mostly symbolic.
We are now in the midst of a process making the WEU an integrated part of the EU. This will formally be concluded at the EU summit meeting in Cologne this summer, and is going on in parallel to the process of making the WEU into the European wing of NATO.
At the NATO summit meeting 23-25 April in Washington it was stated that NATO recognises that the EU is determined to have "a capacity for independent action, so that it (the EU) can take decisions and approve military actions where the Alliance as such (NATO) is not engaged".
It was also approved that "we (NATO) are prepared to define and carry through the necessary arrangements for an easy admittance for the EU to the collective values and capacities of the Alliance (NATO)". That means the WEU can use the NATO facilities for its own actions.
These decisions signal "ownership" of NATO for the EU-states, and on the other hand that the WEU is subordinated to NATO. The second signal is important for the US (and GB). And still the US is a sovereign boss. But Germany in particular can develop as a little cuckoo in the nest through this framework.
The integration of the WEU in the EU, the WEU in NATO and also the expansion of NATO eastwards, all reflect contradictions within NATO, especially within the EU and the WEU, but also between the US and several EU states.
The expansion of NATO was actually forced upon the US by the German initiatives within the EU and the WEU. The original slow pace of NATO expansion expressed by the US was challenged by the German invitation for EU membership to the East European countries. The US first countered this by creating the Partnership for Peace arrangements. But the defence minister of Germany, Volker Ruhe, kept on pushing for EU enlargement until the US had to open the door to new NATO members. In the emerging new "battle of Europe" NATO is the instrument of the US and the EU that of Germany.
3. The fusions and co-operation in the military industrial sector in Europe are on the one hand a consequence of the competition in capitalism; the European enterprises have to co-operate to stand up against the dominant US giants in the field, like Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin. But on the other hand it is also promoting a stronger unification in defence and military policy.
Six EU states, Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Sweden, have joined in the European Aerospace and Defence Company (EADC) to streamline the European airline and weapons industry. This is in parallel to the efforts to make Airbus an independent shareholders company. This in turn requires fusions among the Airbus-co-operators British Aerospace, the German Deutsche Aerospace, the French Aerospatiale and the Spanish Casa.
Integration inside the EU military industry also is meant to compete for contracts with the new Eastern NATO members. For the time being the Americans seem to be front-runners. For instance Lockheed Martin's co-operation with the Polish Optimus favours a choice of the F-16 in the modernising of the Polish Airforce.
IV. Some conclusions
1. The US still plays a dominant role in the military and security field in Europe. Actually Russia is still the main opponent, but is not likely to challenge the US in the near future. Not even if there is going to be a landbased invasion in Kosovo(a).
2. The unification process of the EU also applies to the military and security field. But the differences inside the EU do not make it likely it will form a united bloc against the US in the future. The main results of the process is that Germany will build on its positions within the framework of the EU and the WEU.
3. For some time Germany is still bound to be loyal to US-domination, even if in the nineties we already have three examples of Germany challenging the US:
Firstly when Kohl and Gorbatchov made agreements in Stavropol on the price of the reunion of Germany.
Secondly when Germany pressed for a recognition of Croatia.
Thirdly in pressing the US to speed up the NATO expansion eastward.
4. Both the "New NATO" and the EU-fication of the WEU are militarising the politics of Europe. The Balkan crisis will not be solved by the Kosovo war, but will linger on. Spreading of the conflict further into the "Eurasian corridor" might come in the near future.
In this situation there is a strong need for a new "Zimmerwald-initiativ" from the anti-imperialist forces, not only in Europe but on a global scale.