Workers' Communist Party of Norway (AKP)

The Military Strategy of
the German-led Europe
and the European Army

By Arnljot Ask, international secretary

Contribution to the 8th International Communist Seminar, Brussels, 2-4 May 1999

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I. US-dominated "World Order" with rising new rivalry

Ambitions:

Conditions:

II. German regaining power within US-dominated Europe
III. The military strategy of the EU

1. The awakening of the slumbering WEU in 1984 marks the start of the EU military project. The restructuring of the WEU coincided with the initiative of the Round Table of European Industrialists and the plans for the Internal Market and the EU.

These initiatives took place before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in a situation in which Western Europe was totally dependent upon the US for its military security. The collapse put a new rivalry on the agenda. But, still eight years after the collapse, the military capacity of a joint WEU-military force is "nothing" compared to the US-led NATO. Even the individual armies of Germany, France and Britain are more capable of conducting warfare. But, nevertheless, the restructuring process of the WEU plays an important role in the militarising of Europe and the emerging of contradictions between the US and the German-led bloc in Europe.

2. By now the military structure of WEU have following elements:

WEU operation in the field first took place in 1987 in the Persian Gulf, with a ship during the Iranian-Iraqi-war. Expanding in the Gulf-war in 1991 and in partaking in operations in Africa and now in the Balkans, but still mostly symbolic.

We are now in the midst of a process making the WEU an integrated part of the EU. This will formally be concluded at the EU summit meeting in Cologne this summer, and is going on in parallel to the process of making the WEU into the European wing of NATO.

At the NATO summit meeting 23-25 April in Washington it was stated that NATO recognises that the EU is determined to have "a capacity for independent action, so that it (the EU) can take decisions and approve military actions where the Alliance as such (NATO) is not engaged".

It was also approved that "we (NATO) are prepared to define and carry through the necessary arrangements for an easy admittance for the EU to the collective values and capacities of the Alliance (NATO)". That means the WEU can use the NATO facilities for its own actions.

These decisions signal "ownership" of NATO for the EU-states, and on the other hand that the WEU is subordinated to NATO. The second signal is important for the US (and GB). And still the US is a sovereign boss. But Germany in particular can develop as a little cuckoo in the nest through this framework.

The integration of the WEU in the EU, the WEU in NATO and also the expansion of NATO eastwards, all reflect contradictions within NATO, especially within the EU and the WEU, but also between the US and several EU states.

The expansion of NATO was actually forced upon the US by the German initiatives within the EU and the WEU. The original slow pace of NATO expansion expressed by the US was challenged by the German invitation for EU membership to the East European countries. The US first countered this by creating the Partnership for Peace arrangements. But the defence minister of Germany, Volker Ruhe, kept on pushing for EU enlargement until the US had to open the door to new NATO members. In the emerging new "battle of Europe" NATO is the instrument of the US and the EU that of Germany.

3. The fusions and co-operation in the military industrial sector in Europe are on the one hand a consequence of the competition in capitalism; the European enterprises have to co-operate to stand up against the dominant US giants in the field, like Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin. But on the other hand it is also promoting a stronger unification in defence and military policy.

Six EU states, Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Sweden, have joined in the European Aerospace and Defence Company (EADC) to streamline the European airline and weapons industry. This is in parallel to the efforts to make Airbus an independent shareholders company. This in turn requires fusions among the Airbus-co-operators British Aerospace, the German Deutsche Aerospace, the French Aerospatiale and the Spanish Casa.

Integration inside the EU military industry also is meant to compete for contracts with the new Eastern NATO members. For the time being the Americans seem to be front-runners. For instance Lockheed Martin's co-operation with the Polish Optimus favours a choice of the F-16 in the modernising of the Polish Airforce.

IV. Some conclusions

In this situation there is a strong need for a new "Zimmerwald-initiativ" from the anti-imperialist forces, not only in Europe but on a global scale.